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Abstract
We give an existence result for the principal-agent problem with
adverse selection under general preferences and non-compact alloca-
tion space. The result is mainly based on the fact that the principal
can always improve a feasible contract by another one which makes
larger profit than the outside option from any type of agent. We also
treat the case of type-dependent budget constraints.
Keywords: principal-agent problems with adverse selection, budget con-
straint, direct method of the calculus of variations.
1 Introduction
The principal-agent problem with adverse selection plays a distinguished role
in modern microeconomic theory and has attracted a considerable amount
of attention due to its numerous applications such as nonlinear pricing, tax-
ation theory, insurance or labor contracts, just to name a few. For more on
this broad topic, we refer to the classical textbook of Laffont and Tirole [8]
and the references therein. It is well-known that, apart from the very special
∗CEREMADE, UMR CNRS 7534, Universite´ Paris IX Dauphine, Pl. de Lat-
tre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, FRANCE and INRIA-Paris, MOKAPLAN,
carlier@ceremade.dauphine.fr
†Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, ENSAE Paris-Tech, Cam-
pus Paris-Saclay, 5 Avenue Henry Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau, FRANCE
shuangjian.zhang@ensae.fr
1
case of unidimensional types and quasi-linear utilities satisfying the Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing condition, these problems lead to complicated varia-
tional problems because of the non-local aspect of the incentive-compatibility
condition. Even the case of a bilinear utility leads to challenging problems
subject to a convexity constraint as was shown by Rochet and Chone´ [11]. It
is therefore remarkable that Figalli, Kim and McCann [4], in the quasi-linear
case and more recently, McCann and Zhang [9] for more general preferences,
found conditions, connected to the regularity theory of optimal transport,
under which the problem is convex and identified situations of uniqueness
and stability for optimal contracts under adverse selection. However, even
in these convex cases found in [4] and [9] the characterization of optimal
contracts is mainly an open problem.
The situtation is even more complicated in the realistic case when agents
face a type-dependent budget constraint as was considered in the works of
Monteiro and Page [10] and Che and Gale [3]. And this is the very reason why
we aim to revisit a simpler question, namely the existence of optimal contract
issue. In the sequel, we will try to make as few structural assumptions as
possible, in particular we do not assume any compactness of the allocation
space or particular forms of preferences such as quasi-linearity and we also
allow for type-dependent budget constrained agents. Our paper is of course
very much related to the landmark paper by Monteiro and Page [10], and
previous existence results of the authors, see Carlier [2] and Zhang [12]. It is
also worth mentioning here the work of Ghisi and Gobbino [5] based on an
original Γ-convergence approach (which, however, also assumes a compact
allocation space).
Our objective is twofold. On the one hand, we wish to emphasize that
compactness of the allocation space is not needed a priori, as it can indeed
be guaranteed a posteriori thanks to a simple but efficient a priori estimate
from Monteiro and Page [10]. This a priori estimate was in fact used a
posteriori by Monteiro and Page [10] as well as by Carlier [2]. We will see,
on an example in paragraph 3.3, that this trick can rather be used a priori to
deal with contracts taking values in infinite-dimensional spaces. Our second
aim is to present a simple strategy for proving the existence of an optimal
constract when budget constraints are present which may generate some
discontinuities. Monteiro and Page showed that the resulting difficulties may
be overcome by a certain nonessentiality assumption, we will follow a slightly
different route showing that a non-atomicity condition can be used instead.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main
assumptions. In section 3, we establish an existence result. In section 4, we
extend the analysis to the case of type-dependent budget constraints for the
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agents. Finally, we have gathered in the appendix several simple measurable
selection results used throughout the paper.
2 Problem statement and assumptions
The agent’s type space is a general probability space (X,F , µ), the allocation
space is denoted by Z and we assume that it is a Polish space (i.e. a separable
and completely metrizable topological space). The agent’s preferences are
given by a function U : X × Z → R for which we assume that
∀x ∈ X,U(x, .) is continuous on Z, (2.1)
and
∀z ∈ Z, U(., z) is F -measurable on X . (2.2)
Agents have access to an outside option z0 ∈ Z. A contract is a measur-
able map z : X → Z, and it will be called feasible if it is both individually-
rational, i.e.,
U(x, z(x)) ≥ U(x, z0), ∀x ∈ X, (2.3)
and incentive-compatible, i.e.,
U(x, z(x)) ≥ U(x, z(x′)), ∀(x, x′) ∈ X ×X. (2.4)
Finally a cost function C : Z → R ∪ {+∞} is given for the principal which
we assume to satisfy
C is lower semi-continuous and C(z0) < +∞. (2.5)
The principal’s problem is to find a cost minimizing feasible contract that is
to solve
inf
{∫
X
C(z(x))dµ(x) : z : X → Z feasible
}
. (2.6)
3 Existence of an optimal contract
We will prove that (2.6) admits a solution under an additional coercivity
assumption. Defining
K := {z ∈ Z : C(z) ≤ C(z0), and ∃x ∈ X : U(x, z) ≥ U(x, z0)} (3.1)
our coercivity assumption is that
K is compact. (3.2)
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3.1 An a priori estimate
The main argument for the existence of a solution is based on the following
observation which says that the principal can restrict herself to contracts
that have smaller cost than the outside option (this argument is not new, see
[10] or [2] who made a similar observation but a posteriori whereas it can be
fruitfully used a priori):
Proposition 3.1. Assume (2.1)-(2.2)-(2.5) and (3.2). Let z be a feasible
contract then there exists another feasible contract z˜ such that z˜(X) ⊂ K and∫
X
C(z˜(x))dµ(x) ≤
∫
X
C(z(x))dµ(x).
Proof. We may of course assume that
{x ∈ X : C(z(x)) ≤ C(z0)} 6= ∅ (3.3)
since otherwise the constant contract z˜ ≡ z0 satisfies the desired claim.
Let us assume (3.3) and define for every x ∈ X ,
u(x) := U(x, z(x)).
By individual-rationality and incentive-compatibility, one can write
u(x) = max
z′∈A
U(x, z′) where A := {z0} ∪ {z(x′), x′ ∈ X}.
Let us note that A ∩K 6= ∅ and define
u˜(x) := max
z′∈A∩K
U(x, z′).
We thus have U(x, z0) ≤ u˜(x) ≤ u(x) and u˜(x) = U(x, z(x)) = u(x) whenever
C(z(x)) ≤ C(z0). Since A∩K is compact and by (2.1), for every x ∈ X the
set
Γ(x) := {z ∈ A ∩K : u˜(x) = U(x, z)}
is nonempty and closed. Moreover, thanks to (2.2), the set valued map Γ
has an F -measurable selection (see the Appendix for details) that we denote
by z˜. Since when C(z(x)) ≤ C(z0), z(x) ∈ Γ(x) we may also assume that
z(x) = z˜(x) for every x ∈ X for which C(z(x)) ≤ C(z0). By construction z˜ is
individually-rational and also for every (x, x′) ∈ X×X since z˜(x′) ∈ A∩K we
have u˜(x) = U(x, z˜(x)) ≥ U(x, z˜(x′)) so that z˜ is also incentive compatible.
Finally C(z˜(x)) = C(z(x)) when C(z(x)) ≤ C(z0) and C(z˜(x)) ≤ C(z0) ≤
C(z(x)) otherwise which shows that the feasible constract z˜ has lower cost
than the original one z and it takes by construction its values in K.
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3.2 An existence result
Since the constant contract equal to the oustide option z0 is feasible, the
minimization problem (2.6) can be restricted to the set of feasible contracts
for which ∫
X
C(z(x))dµ(x) ≤ C(z0)
hence for which (3.3) holds. Proposition 3.1 therefore enables us to reduce
the principal’s problem to the compact allocation space K (given by (3.1))
instead of Z. From this reduction, classical arguments in the lines of those
of [10], [2], [12] give the existence of an optimal contract:
Theorem 3.2. Under assumptions (2.1)-(2.2)-(2.5) and (3.2), the princi-
pal’s problem (2.6) admits at least a solution.
Proof. Let (zn)n be a minimizing sequence for (2.6), i.e., a sequence of feasible
contracts such that
lim
n
∫
X
C(zn(x))dµ(x) = inf(2.6). (3.4)
Assuming that
∫
X
C(zn(x))dµ(x) ≤ C(z0) and using Proposition 3.1, we may
further assume that zn(X) ⊂ K for each n. Then define
un(x) := U(x, zn(x)) = max
z∈An
U(x, z) where An := {z0} ∪ {zn(x), x ∈ X}.
Since the nonempty compact set An is included in K for every n, we may as-
sume, taking a subsequence if necessary, thatAn converges to some nonempty
compact subset A∗ of K in the Hausdorff distance1, i.e.,
lim
n
dH(An,A
∗) = 0. (3.5)
Then define
u∗(x) := sup
z∈A∗
U(x, z). (3.6)
Define also the set-valued map x ∈ X 7→ Γ∗(x) by
Γ∗(x) := {z ∈ K : ∃nj →∞ s.t. znj (x)→ z, C(znj (x))→ lim inf
n
C(zn(x))}.
(3.7)
1Denoting by d a distance that completely metrizes the topology of the separable space
Z, and by dist(A, z) := infz′∈A d(z
′, z) the distance from z to the set A, the Hausdorff dis-
tance between the sets A and B is dH(A,B) := max(supb∈B dist(A, b), supa∈A dist(B, a)).
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Γ∗(x) is a nonempty compact set for every x and our assumptions guarantee
that Γ∗ has an F -measurable selection which we denote by z∗ (see Lemma 4.4
in the Appendix for details). Since z0 ∈ A
∗, we have U(x, z∗(x)) ≥ U(x, z0)
for each x ∈ X so that z∗ is individually-rational. Let x ∈ X and z be
a cluster point of zn(x) such that lim supn un(x) = lim supn U(x, zn(x)) =
U(x, z). It follows from (3.5) that z ∈ A∗ hence
lim sup
n
un(x) ≤ u
∗(x). (3.8)
Now let z ∈ A∗, again by (3.5), there exists a sequence (z′n)n converging
to z such that z′n ∈ An for each n. By incentive-compatibility we have
un(x) = U(x, zn(x)) ≥ U(x, z
′
n) for each n so that lim infn un(x) ≥ U(x, z).
And taking the supremum in z ∈ A∗ we get
lim inf
n
un(x) ≥ u
∗(x). (3.9)
From (3.8)-(3.9), we deduce that un(x) = U(x, zn(x)) converges to u
∗(x)
for each x ∈ X . Choosing a subsequence of zn(x) that converges to z
∗(x)
therefore gives u∗(x) = U(x, z∗(x)). Then for any (x′, x) ∈ X × X , since
z∗(x′) ∈ A∗ we have u∗(x) = U(x, z∗(x)) ≥ U(x, z∗(x′)) which shows that z∗
is incentive-compatible. Finally, Fatou’s lemma (note that C(zn) is bounded
from below by the minimum of C on the compact set K) and the fact that
z∗(x) ∈ Γ∗(x) where Γ∗(x) is given by (3.7) give
inf(2.6) ≥
∫
X
lim inf
n
C(zn(x))dµ(x) =
∫
X
C(z∗(x))dµ(x)
so that z∗ solves (2.6).
3.3 Examples
Finite-dimensional allocations: a quasilinear case
The simplest example is the case when z = (p, q) ∈ R × Rd where p ∈ R
represents the price of the contract and q ∈ Rd is the product attributes.
Assume that preferences are quasi linear, i.e.,
U(x, z) = ϕ(x) · q − p,
where ϕ is a certain measurable and bounded map from the type space X to
R
d. Let us also assume separability of the cost:
C(z) = c(q)− p.
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Denoting by (p0, q0) the outside option, the closed set K defined in (3.1) is
included in the set of (p, q) ∈ R× Rd for which
sup
x∈X
‖ϕ(x)‖ ‖q − q0‖+ p0 ≥ p, and c(q)− p ≤ c(q0)− p0. (3.10)
So if the cost c is superlinear, i.e.,
lim
‖q‖→∞
c(q)
‖q‖
= +∞,
the bounds in (3.10) give a bound on q and then on p which implies that our
assumption (3.2) is satisfied.
Finite-dimensional allocations: a non-quasilinear case
For each agent x ∈ X , the utility of purchasing a product q ∈ Rd at price
p ∈ R is assumed to be
U(x, z) = b(x, q)− f(x, p),
where z = (p, q) ∈ R × Rd is the contract. For each contract z, the cost to
the principal is
C(z) = c(q)− p.
Assume b(x, ·) is Lipschitz, uniformly in x, with Lipschitz constant Lipb,
f(x, ·) is strictly increasing in p and ∂pf(x, ·) ≥ λ > 0 for all x. Finally also
assume that the cost c is superlinear in q ∈ Rd. Then K defined in (3.1) is
contained in the set of (p, q) ∈ R× Rd such that
c(q) ≤ c(q0) +
Lipb
λ
· ‖q − q0‖ and c(q)− c(q0) + p0 ≤ p ≤ p0 +
Lipb
λ
‖q − q0‖.
Since c is superlinear, the two conditions above imply that both p and q
are bounded. Thus, K is compact.
Finite-dimensional allocations: a fully nonlinear case
Following McCann and Zhang [9], consider now a general nonlinear utility
function of the form
U(x, z) = G(x, q, p),
where z = (p, q) ∈ R× Rd represents the contract with agent x. Assume G
is strictly decreasing on price p, which means that the same product with a
higher price provides less utility to agents.
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Each contract z has a cost to the principal, which is
C(z) = c(q)− p.
Assume c is superlinear in q, G satisfies ∂pG(x, q, p) ≤ −λ < 0 for all
(x, z) ∈ X × Z and G(x, ·, p0) is Lipschitz, uniformly in x, with Lipschitz
constant LipG. To show that K is bounded, it is useful to define K1 =
K ∩ {(q, p) ∈ Rd × R : p ≤ p0} and K2 = K \K1.
By definition, we know for any (q, p) ∈ K1,
c(q)− p0 ≤ c(q)− p ≤ c(q0)− p0.
Since c is superlinear, this implies q is bounded. Since c(q) − c(q0) + p0 ≤
p ≤ p0, p is also bounded. And thus, K1 is bounded.
Now, if (p, q) ∈ K2 there exists x ∈ X such that G(x, q, p) ≥ G(x, q0, p0),
but since p > p0 and ∂pG ≤ −λ, using the Lipschitz assumption onG(x, ., p0),
we have
G(x, q0, p0) ≤ G(x, q, p) ≤ G(x, q, p0)− λ(p− p0)
≤ G(x, q0, p0)− λ(p− p0) + LipG‖q − q0‖
hence
0 ≤ p− p0 ≤
LipG
λ
‖q − q0‖, c(q) ≤ c(q0) +
LipG
λ
‖q − q0‖.
Since c is superlinear, this implies q is bounded and p as well so K2 is
bounded. Therefore, K is compact.
Infinite-dimensional allocations
We now consider the possibility that the allocation z is infinite-dimensional,
one can think for instance of a time-dependent function. We consider con-
tracts of the form z = (p, q) with p ∈ R and q ∈ Z := L2((0, T ),Rd), a utility
of the form
U(x, z) :=
∫ T
0
v(t, x, q(t))dt− p
and a cost
C(z) =
∫ T
0
(c(t, q(t)) + |q˙(t)|2)dt− p
(with C = +∞ whenever q˙ is not L2) and an outside option (z0, q0) with
q˙0 ∈ L
2. Then if c(t, .) is superlinear uniformly in t and v(t, x, .) is Lipschitz
uniformly in (t, x), the set K consists of (p, q) ∈ R × L2 such that both∫ T
0
(|q| + |q˙|2)dt and p are uniformly bounded, it is therefore compact in
R× L2 by the Rellich-Kondrachov Theorem (see [1]).
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4 The budget-constrained case
We now extend the model of section 2 and our existence result to the case
where agents have a (type-dependent) budget constraint. This case is rele-
vant in applications and was considered by Che and Gale [3] and was analyzed
from the existence perspective by Monteiro and Page [10] who were able to
deal with the discontinuity resulting from the budget constraint thanks to a
specific assumption called nonessentiality that we will not use here, instead
we will use a non-atomicity assumption on the type distribution.
4.1 Model and assumptions
We consider the following setting for the budget-constrained principal-agent
problem. The type of the agents will consist of a preference parameter x
and a budget y. The set of preference parameters is denoted by X which is
equipped with a σ-algebra F , the set of budgets is a closed interval Y with
a finite lower bound y and it is equipped with its Borel algebra which we
denote by B. Contracts consist of pairs (p, q) where p ∈ R denotes the price
of the contract and q denotes an allocation, while the set of allocations is
denoted by Q which is assumed to be a Polish space. The outside option
(p0, q0) ∈ R×Q is assumed to satisfy
p0 ≤ y (4.1)
which makes it affordable even to agents with the lowest budget. Preferences
are given by a function V : X × R×Q→ R and we assume that
∀x ∈ X, V (x, ., .) is continuous on R×Q, (4.2)
and
∀(p, q) ∈ R×Q, V (., p, q) is F -measurable on X . (4.3)
The joint distribution of types (x, y) is given by a probability measure θ on
X×Y (equipped with the product σ-algebra F⊗B). Finally the cost for the
principal is given by a function C : R × Q → R ∪ {+∞} which we assume
to satisfy
C is lower semi-continuous and C(p0, q0) < +∞. (4.4)
Definition 4.1. A budget-constrained-feasible contract is an F⊗B-measurable
map (x, y) ∈ X × Y 7→ (p(x, y), q(x, y)) ∈ R×Q that satisfies:
• the budget constraint: p(x, y) ≤ y, for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y ;
9
• individual rationality, V (x, p(x, y), q(x, y)) ≥ V (x, p0, q0), for every
(x, y) ∈ X × Y ;
• budget-constrained incentive-compatibility, i.e., for every (x, y, x′, y′) ∈
(X × Y )2 if p(x′, y′) ≤ y then
V (x, p(x, y), q(x, y)) ≥ V (x, p(x′, y′), q(x′, y′)). (4.5)
The budget-constrained principal’s problem then reads
inf
{∫
X×Y
C(p(x, y), q(x, y))dθ(x, y) : (p, q) budget-constrained-feasible
}
.
(4.6)
To prove that (4.6) admits solutions we shall need two more technical
assumptions. The first one is a coercicity assumption similar to (3.2). Define
Γ as the closure of the set of (p, q) ∈ R × Q such that C(p, q) ≤ C(p0, q0)
and there exists (x, y) ∈ X×Y such that p ≤ y and V (x, p, q) ≥ V (x, p0, q0),
then our coercivity assumption is that
Γ is compact. (4.7)
Our last assumption is a non-atomicity condition that will enable us to deal
with the possible discontinuities caused by the budget constraint on the in-
direct utility function. Our non-atomicity condition is that for every mea-
surable subset S of X × Y , one has2
θ(S) = 0 whenever Sx is at most countable for every x ∈ Q. (4.8)
Here, given x ∈ X , Sx denotes the slice Sx := {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ S}.
4.2 Existence
Our first step in the existence proof is the following variant of Proposition
3.1:
Lemma 4.2. Assume (4.1)-(4.2)-(4.3)-(4.4)-(4.7). Let (p, q) be a budget-
constrained-feasible contract then there exists another budget-constrained-feasible
contract (p˜, q˜) such that (p˜, q˜)(X × Y ) ⊂ Γ and∫
X×Y
C(p˜(x, y), q˜(x, y))dθ(x, y) ≤
∫
X×Y
C(p(x, y), q(x, y))dθ(x, y).
2When X is a Polish space, by the disintegration Theorem, θ can be disintegrated with
respect to its first marginal α as θ(dx, dy) = θ(dy|x)α(dx), in this case condition (4.8)
amounts to saying that for α-a.e. x, the conditional probability θ(.|x) is atomless.
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Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.1, there is no loss of generality in
assuming that
{(x, y) ∈ X × Y : C(p(x, y), q(x, y)) ≤ C(p0, q0)} 6= ∅. (4.9)
Let us define
v(x, y) := V (x, p(x, y), q(x, y)), ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
and observe that by individual-rationality and budget-constrained incentive-
compatilbility v can be expressed as
v(x, y) := max
(p,q)∈A, p≤y
V (x, p, q),
where
A := {(p0, q0)} ∪ {(p(x′, y′), q(x′, y′)), (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y }.
Since A∩{(p, q) ∈ R×Q : p ≤ y}∩Γ is non-empty and compact and thanks
to (4.2), we can define the following function (that is everywhere finite):
v˜(x, y) := max
(p,q)∈A∩Γ, p≤y
V (x, p, q).
Moreover, thanks to Lemma 4.6, we can chose a maximizer (p˜(x, y), q˜(x, y))
in the program above which depends in a measurable way on (x, y) and we
can also assume that
(p˜(x, y), q˜(x, y)) = (p(x, y), q(x, y)) whenever C(p(x, y), q(x, y)) ≤ C(p0, q0).
Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we deduce that (p˜, q˜) is a budget-
constrained-feasible contract and C(p˜(x, y), q˜(x, y)) ≤ C(p(x, y), q(x, y)) for
every (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
We then have the existence result:
Theorem 4.3. Assume (4.1)-(4.2)-(4.3)-(4.4)-(4.7) and (4.8) then (4.6) ad-
mits at least a solution.
Proof. Let (pn, qn) be a minimizing sequence for (4.6), thanks to Lemma 4.2
there is no loss of generality in assuming that (pn, qn)(X × Y ) ⊂ Γ where Γ
is the compact set defined above assumption (4.7). Defining
vn(x, y) := V (x, pn(x, y), qn(x, y)), ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
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budget-constrained feasibility then gives the representation
vn(x, y) = max
(p,q)∈An, p≤y
V (x, p, q),
where
An := {(p0, q0)} ∪ {(pn(x′, y′), qn(x′, y′)), (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y }.
Since each compact set An is included in the compact set Γ, we may also
assume, passing to a subsequence if necessary, that there is a compact subset
A∗ of Γ, containing (p0, q0) such that
lim
n
dH(An,A
∗) = 0. (4.10)
Then define
v∗(x, y) = max
(p,q)∈A∗, p≤y
V (x, p, q).
Thanks to Lemma 4.4, there exists a measurable selection (p∗, q∗) of the
set-valued map defined for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y by
Γ∗(x, y) := {(p, q) ∈ Γ : ∃nj →∞ s.t. (pnj(x, y), qnj(x, y))→ (p, q),
C(pnj(x, y), qnj(x, y))→ lim inf
n
C(pn(x, y), qn(x, y))}.
Note that by Fatou’s Lemma,∫
X×Y
C(p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y))dθ(x, y) ≤ inf (4.6). (4.11)
So if (p∗, q∗) was budget-constrained-feasible, the proof would be complete,
but it is not necessarily the case that (p∗, q∗) is budget-constrained-incentive-
compatible (and this is where assumption (4.8) comes into play). Note that
by construction and using budget-constrained-feasibility of (pn, qn), we obvi-
ously have that for every (x, y) ∈ X×Y , p∗(x, y) ≤ y, V (x, p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)) ≥
V (x, p0, q0); note also that (p
∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)) ∈ A∗ because of (4.10), in par-
ticular since p∗(x, y) ≤ y this gives
v∗(x, y) ≥ V (x, p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)), ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y. (4.12)
From (4.2), (4.10), it is easy to deduce that
v∗ ≥ lim sup
n
vn. (4.13)
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Now observe that v∗ is nondecreasing and upper semi-continuous with respect
to its second argument. Hence, defining
v∗−(x, y) := lim
ε→0+
v∗(x, y − ε), ∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ Y \ {y}, v∗−(x, y) := v
∗(x, y),
the (measurable) singular set
S := {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : v∗(x, y) > v∗−(x, y)}
has at most countable slices Sx for every x ∈ X . Assumption (4.8) thus
implies that θ(S) = 0. Note also that, again by (4.8), θ(X × {y}) = 0.
Therefore the regular set R := (X × (Y \ {y})) \ S is of full measure for
θ. Let now (x, y) ∈ R, ε > 0 be such that y − ε ∈ Y , by compactness
of A∗ and definition of v∗ there is a (p, q) ∈ A∗ such that p ≤ y − ε and
v∗(x, y − ε) = V (x, p, q). Thanks to (4.10), there is a sequence (pn, qn)
converging to (p, q) with (pn, qn) ∈ An for every n and pn ≤ y for large
enough n so that
lim inf
n
vn(x, y) ≥ lim inf
n
V (x, pn, qn) = v
∗(x, y − ε).
Letting ε→ 0+ thus gives
lim inf
n
vn(x, y) ≥ v
∗
−(x, y). (4.14)
Recalling (4.13) and using the fact that v∗ = v∗− on R, we deduce that
vn → v
∗ on R. (4.15)
In particular if (x, y) ∈ R, since vn(x, y) = V (x, pn(x, y), qn(x, y)) con-
verges to v∗(x, y), choosing a subsequence of (pn(x, y), qn(x, y)) converging
to (p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)) gives
v∗(x, y) = V (x, p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)).
This enables us to conclude that for every (x, y) ∈ R, any (x′, y′) ∈ X ×
Y , whenever p∗(x′, y′) ≤ y one has v∗(x, y) = V (x, p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)) ≥
V (x, p∗(x′, y′), q∗(x′, y′)). The last step is to modify the contract (p∗, q∗)
on a negligible set to make it budget-constrained feasible. To do this, first
set
A˜ := {(p0, q0)} ∪ {(p∗(x′, y′), q∗(x′, y′)), (x′, y′) ∈ R}
and
v˜(x, y) := max
(p,q)∈A˜, p≤y
V (x, p, q),
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and let (p˜, q˜) be a measurable selection of the set-valued map (x, y) 7→
{(p, q) ∈ A˜ : p ≤ y, v˜(x, y) = V (x, p, q)}. Since v˜(x, y) = v∗(x, y) =
V (x, p∗(x, y), q∗(x, y)) when (x, y) ∈ R, we may further impose that (p˜, q˜)
and (p∗, q∗) coincide on R hence θ-almost everywhere. Then, it is straight-
forward to check that (p˜, q˜) is budget-constrained feasible, and the fact that
it solves (4.6) directly follows from (4.11) and the fact that (p˜, q˜) = (p∗, q∗)
θ-almost everywhere.
Appendix: on measurable selections
We have invoked several times the existence of measurable selections of cer-
tain set-valued maps, we gather here some detailed justifications for the exis-
tence of such maps. Given a measurable space (X,F), a Polish space Z and
a set valued map Γ : X → 2Z with nonempty values, a measurable selection
of Γ is by definition an F -measurable (single-valued) map z: X → Z such
that z(x) ∈ Γ(x) for all x ∈ X . A general existence result for measurable
selections is given by the Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem (see [7]
and also the survey by Himmelberg [6]) which ensures that whenever
• Γ(x) is closed and nonempty for every x ∈ X , and
• Γ is weakly-measurable in the sense that for every open subset U of Z,
the set Γ−1(U) := {x ∈ X : Γ(x) ∩ U 6= ∅} belongs to F
then Γ admits a measurable selection.
In fact we do not use the full generality of the Kuratowski and Ryll-
Nardzewski Theorem. The set-valued maps we have encountered through the
paper satisfy a stronger measurability property than the one above, namely
they satisfy that for every closed subset F of Z, Γ−1(F ) belongs to F (to
see that it implies weak-measurability it is enough to write the open set U
as a countable union of closed sets). The first measurable selection result we
have used is the following:
Lemma 4.4. Let K be a nonempty compact subset of Z, zn be a sequence
of measurable maps, zn: X → K, and let C: K → R ∪ {+∞} be lower
semi-continuous and not identically +∞ on K. For all x ∈ X, let
Γ(x) := {z ∈ K : ∃nj →∞ : znj (x)→ z, C(znj(x))→ lim inf
n
C(zn(x))}.
Then Γ admits a measurable selection.
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Proof. It is easy to check that Γ(x) is a nonempty and closed subset of Z
for every x ∈ X . As explained above, a sufficient condition for the existence
of a measurable selection is that Γ−1(F ) is measurable whenever F is closed
but it is easy to check that
Γ−1(F ) = {x ∈ X : lim inf
n
(dist(zn(x), F ) + C(zn(x))) = lim inf
n
C(zn(x))}
which written in this way is obviously measurable.
In the proof of Theorem 3.2, we have used:
Lemma 4.5. Let U satisfy (2.1)-(2.2), A be a nonempty compact subset of
Z and set
vA(x) := max
z∈A
U(x, z),
then vA is measurable and setting for every x ∈ X,
ΓA(x) := {z ∈ A : U(x, z) = vA(x)}
then ΓA admits a measurable selection.
Proof. The fact that vA is measurable follows by taking {an}n a countable
and dense subset of A and writing vA(x) = limnmaxk≤n U(x, ak). Obvioulsy,
ΓA(x) is nonempty and closed for every x ∈ X . Now if F is a closed subset of
A we claim that Γ−1A (F ) is measurable, this set being empty when A∩F = ∅
we may assume that the (compact) set A ∩ F 6= ∅, then Γ−1A (F ) is the set
where vA and vA∩F coincide, it is therefore measurable.
The following variant of Lemma 4.5 was used for the budget-constrained
model:
Lemma 4.6. Let V satisfy (4.2)-(4.3), A be a nonempty compact subset of
R×Q and set for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y
vA(x, y) := max
(p,q)∈A,p≤y
V (x, p, q),
(with the convention that vA(x, y) = −∞ whenever A ∩ (−∞, y] × Q = ∅),
then vA is measurable and setting for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
ΣA(x, y) := {(p, q) ∈ A : p ≤ y, V (x, p, q) = vA(x, y)}
then ΣA admits an F ⊗ B-measurable selection.
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Proof. For λ > 0 set
vλA(x, y) := max
(p,q)∈A
{V (x, p, q)− λ(p− y)+)}
thanks to Lemma 4.5, vλA is measurable and it is easy to check that v
λ
A
converges in a nonincreasing way to vA as λ → +∞ which shows that vA
is measurable. The fact that ΣA admits a measurable selection can then be
shown as in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
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